First of all, this post is the thought process that came after reading an excellent article over at The New Statesman by Laurie Penny. That link will take you there. I highly recommend reading it first, otherwise this will make even less sense on its own merits than it will as a response piece. Also, the article contains naughty words. This piece may as well by the time I'm done with it (Update: It does. Proceed accordingly). No being impressionable while reading either, please.
The current rise of the Manic, Pixie Dream Girl (Hereafter referred to by an acronym, because WDLA?) in literature and especially cinema is a slightly depressing trend on multiple levels. For those of us who like characterization, this is a bad development, as MPDGs often lack exactly that (Both characterization and development). To an extent, they are the updated, cutely quirky version of the 1960s Hippy Chic(k), which is also bad for those of us in favor of realism, as such animals are often found to be mythical in the real world once they sober up and recognize the kind of lifestyle required by the character type. Sleeping on floors is not quite as attractive as it sounds, and sleeping in the woods leaves one wholly vulnerable to bear attack. Either way, it isn't worth it. But where is this all coming from? What is the root of this current evil in our popular culture?
I blame Zach Braff. While making The Royal Tennenbaums, it's reported that Gene Hackman told director/co-writer Wes Anderson, among other things, to "Pull up your pants and act like a man." I imagine Hackman would simply have walked off the set of Garden State while emitting a snarl of disgust. Garden State sets Braff's character up with an MPDG played by Natalie Portman and her helmet, here to save Braff. She does this primarily by being there while he stares blankly at the camera in a failed attempt to convey some sort of inner conflict, simply a foil used by the male lead. In this role, Portman is a prop. Her character being who she is is of almost no relevance whatsoever to the film, as she is portraying an hour and a half long deus ex machina rather than an actual person.
This gets towards the heart of the failure of the trope: These characters are not set up as people. The Penny article gets at this rather nicely, but then fails to turn around and look at the converse: Why would people try to imitate this two-dimensional character in real life? What is the possible appeal of mimicking a character who is mostly there as a reaction shot? Unfortunately, I have no rational idea, as it doesn't seem to make sense. Good art imitates life, but when life starts to imitate bad art you are left with a problem. It seems possible that our popular culture is getting so stale and homogenous (Even as innovations like the internet allow niches to go off and form their own corner of GroupThink™ away from the rest of the world) that anyone who doesn't simply fit into society in the most literal, physical-only sense has turned into some sort of mythical beast to be grasped at. Especially as the character gains in popularity, you simply are going a different route to attempt to fit in, setting yourself up as an obvious member of one group versus another. There's no actual individuality involved. Simply misguided brand homogenization disguised as individuality (Sprite was way ahead of cinema on this one).
Most of the movies made about this (And, according to her essay, Penny's ex-boyfriends) seem to be looking to the MPDG character for salvation. But what do they have to be saved from? We are living in a time of almost unmatched quality of life. We are living longer than we ever have before. We are making more money than ever before. Foods from all over the globe are available in our supermarkets. We have massive available entertainment options. Granted, most of them suck, but let's not whitewash the past here. The past still contains Jane Austen, no matter how much I personally avoid her (For the sake of gender balance, it also contains George Bernard Shaw. Ugh). These people mostly seem to need saving from a dull existence, but here's the thing: If your existence is dull, you're doing it wrong. You have the whole of human literature to pull from. Go read it. You can get it for free from the library. There are massive amounts of interesting music out there, and equally massive numbers of ways to get it for free by stealing it on the internet. Go listen. We have video games being made that push things forward in creative new ways, even if you only see ads for XTreemFaceShooter4 on the magic box. We are in a veritable golden age of board games (Because Monopoly sucks). Boredom is not an innate part of the human condition. It is the mind's response to your personal decision to not challenge it. You do not need a storybook character to save you. You need to try harder. Caring is certainly not creepy. This whole trend is the sad-sack hipster version of Scientology, a religion founded on the premise that it is not possible to be rich and still have negative thoughts, so aliens must be at fault. Pull your pants up and save yourself (Also, on a more personal level, should Laurie Penny read this: Laurie, if your boyfriends have been shocked to discover that you are not some mythical creature, but in fact are a real-life human being, please stop dating assholes).
And yes, the interpolation there means what you think it does: These characters are largely written by men. Men who are not looking to write a female character, but who are simply looking to write some sort of unchanging ideal. This whole thing is slightly Weird Science-esque, if not for the fact that it is influencing real life. So, to all the ladies out there (Shoutout!): If we (Men/assholes) are looking to use you for our own personal salvation but not actually looking to you as people, please do not enable us. Call us on it. That is incredibly inconsiderate behavior, and should not be tolerated. Just because Zooey Deschanel looks pretty doing it does not make it an attractive lifestyle. The whole thing reeks of First World Problems, which are certainly a thing, but not necessarily a concerning one. Right now we are growing up in an America that prioritizes higher education, even as costs for higher education spiral out of control. So students are amassing more and more debt, yet when they enter the workforce, the increasing globalization and corporatization of the world seem to have depressed the job market (I didn't major in economics. Bear with me and call me on it if I'm wrong), both in terms of available jobs and salary of said jobs. The majority of those graduating college probably would have been better off simply going to a trade school of some type and becoming a mechanic (If your trade school does not offer mechanic courses, you have chosen a defective trade school). And yet we still have it well. So the brain, trying to rationalize this, moves in the direction of bad, mopy art, which further influences real-life trends. But none of this is helping, so look, youth of America, let's have a chat.
You are probably screwed. There are many people out there who are smarter than I am who will tell you some variation of this theme. So just go with it. You still have a high quality of life. Learn who you are and like yourself for that. It matters more than some sort of materialistic arms race, or soft-focus filmed navel gazing. No one is going to save you. That's something you have to do yourself. And the easiest way to do it is to find out what 'yourself' actually means and be that, not imitating what you see around you. As a wise man once said, you are not your fucking khakis. But seriously, pull them up. You look ridiculous.
Showing posts with label Really long posts. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Really long posts. Show all posts
Wednesday, July 10, 2013
Monday, June 11, 2012
I'll Miss You: Ween Break Up
The key to being a (I'm just gonna go ahead and say it here; we're discussing Ween for God's sake) successful smart-ass is never letting on when you're joking. With that in mind, perhaps Ween will announce the impending release of their new album next week. They will almost certainly announce the dates of their new tour in a couple years, though it might be better for all parties concerned if they don't. After all, Ween were a band built largely upon spot on, unflinching musical genre parodies and the ingestion of anything not tied down that could fit into the mouth. And for everyone who chooses to travel down that road, a point arises when it has passed from questionable idea to very bad plan. Ween hit that point over a decade ago, and only with the news of the band's break-up has it become apparent that this isn't just some joke from a band waiting around the corner ready to laugh at us when we believe them.
It is now 2012, 28 years after two fourteen-year-olds decided to form a band, and fifteen years after they released their last good studio album. So what is the big deal? Well, that would be what came in the middle. In a span of eight years, Ween released six albums that ranged from absolutely brilliant to completely unlistenable, each of which was fairly mind-blowing even to those of us out there who plumb the varying ranges of sobriety. Beyond this, they recorded what seems to be an equal number of brilliant pieces which didn't even make their albums proper, spread out across soundtracks, compilations, EPs and probably their garage sales if they ran low on funds for drugs (Though even I wouldn't pay for the masters for Candy). This period saw them inexplicably given a major label deal which they responded to by recording their most bizarre album ever, which resulted in Push th' Little Daisies getting actual money pushing it on MTV, a situation which probably had some suits soiling their drawers at Elektra. The duo then became a full band, for the first time sounding as if they were recording songs that were clearly written on a load of drugs while actually fairly sober. Then they released a country album. It was a remarkably fertile creative span, and one that gave them a massive catalog to draw from during their marathon live performances, songs that stayed perenially fresh as the band changing from two guys with a drum machine to a five-piece rock powerhouse forced them to reconstruct the songs for each new stop along the way. And they toured those songs hard.
Every time they put out a new album, and quite a few times that they didn't, for the last decade, Ween would set out to play every town in America that would allow them to display their particular blend of drunken genre-hopping and jamming, playing gloriously extended versions of their songs that they inevitably seemed unlikely to remember upon waking up the following day unless someone had fortuitously taped the proceedings. And many times, it turned out someone had. And then Ween would release the tape. All in all, they wound up releasing six live albums over ten years. Granted, some of these were old tapes documenting prior iterations of the band's career, and they were usually somewhere between very good and excellent. But man, that is a lot of live albums for a span of years which only saw them release three proper studio records. That should probably have been the clue that the party was nearing its end. That and the rumors of rehab which constantly dogged the band. But every time the rumors seemed to threaten to overtake them they were back onstage, and look how much fun they're having! Of course they're still going.
At least until they weren't. It ended the only way it could, with most of the band not being aware of it. It happened after one of their last stage performances ended in a complete meltdown. It happened five years after their last studio album, without even any rumors of another one in the works. And when it happened it became apparent that they had actually been done for years. This is perfectly okay.
During their heyday, Ween had more ideas than they knew what to do with, throwing out brilliance and trash at a rate not seen since Robert Pollard lost the ability to write five songs on the can, three of which would be good (He can, however, still write five songs while in the can). And this furious pace is what keeps them alive. That track a couple lines above didn't make it onto one of their studio albums. Also, it is a gorgeous ballad. Yes, they did that. They also did everything else. How well and how fast they did it made it possible to ignore the obvious with each passing year after the release of The Mollusk, when it became apparent that the brilliance would be concentrated only in flashes rather than sprinkled over the bulk of their recorded output going forward. There was simply so much to catch up on. Sure, the entire second half of Quebec was incredibly dull, but have you heard this new collection of previously unreleased material? They've still got it!
While it seems inevitable that Ween will tour again down the road, it is entirely possible that they shouldn't. The odds of them releasing music that adds to their legacy seems very slim, outweighed by the possibility that the combination of Dean and Gene Ween may no longer be good for people who at this point in life may have a greater need for sobriety than they used to. If they do come back, it will generate money, not art. Until they die, they will likely enjoy playing music together, even if they no longer have any reason to record music together. Even if they shouldn't play music together anymore. When they do reunite, they will put on a fun concert, but it will be a nostalgia-laden exercise, as it has been for years now. There's nothing wrong with a bit of nostalgia here and there, but it cannot compare to the sheer joy of diving into the things the duo did in the past and hearing them communicate through a prog-rock epic that sounds like it is being written from the point of view of a child molester the simple message that they cannot believe they are being paid to do this. We had the best time at their party. I choose to thank them like this. By writing about them on the internet (Naughty words in the video below).
It is now 2012, 28 years after two fourteen-year-olds decided to form a band, and fifteen years after they released their last good studio album. So what is the big deal? Well, that would be what came in the middle. In a span of eight years, Ween released six albums that ranged from absolutely brilliant to completely unlistenable, each of which was fairly mind-blowing even to those of us out there who plumb the varying ranges of sobriety. Beyond this, they recorded what seems to be an equal number of brilliant pieces which didn't even make their albums proper, spread out across soundtracks, compilations, EPs and probably their garage sales if they ran low on funds for drugs (Though even I wouldn't pay for the masters for Candy). This period saw them inexplicably given a major label deal which they responded to by recording their most bizarre album ever, which resulted in Push th' Little Daisies getting actual money pushing it on MTV, a situation which probably had some suits soiling their drawers at Elektra. The duo then became a full band, for the first time sounding as if they were recording songs that were clearly written on a load of drugs while actually fairly sober. Then they released a country album. It was a remarkably fertile creative span, and one that gave them a massive catalog to draw from during their marathon live performances, songs that stayed perenially fresh as the band changing from two guys with a drum machine to a five-piece rock powerhouse forced them to reconstruct the songs for each new stop along the way. And they toured those songs hard.
Every time they put out a new album, and quite a few times that they didn't, for the last decade, Ween would set out to play every town in America that would allow them to display their particular blend of drunken genre-hopping and jamming, playing gloriously extended versions of their songs that they inevitably seemed unlikely to remember upon waking up the following day unless someone had fortuitously taped the proceedings. And many times, it turned out someone had. And then Ween would release the tape. All in all, they wound up releasing six live albums over ten years. Granted, some of these were old tapes documenting prior iterations of the band's career, and they were usually somewhere between very good and excellent. But man, that is a lot of live albums for a span of years which only saw them release three proper studio records. That should probably have been the clue that the party was nearing its end. That and the rumors of rehab which constantly dogged the band. But every time the rumors seemed to threaten to overtake them they were back onstage, and look how much fun they're having! Of course they're still going.
At least until they weren't. It ended the only way it could, with most of the band not being aware of it. It happened after one of their last stage performances ended in a complete meltdown. It happened five years after their last studio album, without even any rumors of another one in the works. And when it happened it became apparent that they had actually been done for years. This is perfectly okay.
During their heyday, Ween had more ideas than they knew what to do with, throwing out brilliance and trash at a rate not seen since Robert Pollard lost the ability to write five songs on the can, three of which would be good (He can, however, still write five songs while in the can). And this furious pace is what keeps them alive. That track a couple lines above didn't make it onto one of their studio albums. Also, it is a gorgeous ballad. Yes, they did that. They also did everything else. How well and how fast they did it made it possible to ignore the obvious with each passing year after the release of The Mollusk, when it became apparent that the brilliance would be concentrated only in flashes rather than sprinkled over the bulk of their recorded output going forward. There was simply so much to catch up on. Sure, the entire second half of Quebec was incredibly dull, but have you heard this new collection of previously unreleased material? They've still got it!
While it seems inevitable that Ween will tour again down the road, it is entirely possible that they shouldn't. The odds of them releasing music that adds to their legacy seems very slim, outweighed by the possibility that the combination of Dean and Gene Ween may no longer be good for people who at this point in life may have a greater need for sobriety than they used to. If they do come back, it will generate money, not art. Until they die, they will likely enjoy playing music together, even if they no longer have any reason to record music together. Even if they shouldn't play music together anymore. When they do reunite, they will put on a fun concert, but it will be a nostalgia-laden exercise, as it has been for years now. There's nothing wrong with a bit of nostalgia here and there, but it cannot compare to the sheer joy of diving into the things the duo did in the past and hearing them communicate through a prog-rock epic that sounds like it is being written from the point of view of a child molester the simple message that they cannot believe they are being paid to do this. We had the best time at their party. I choose to thank them like this. By writing about them on the internet (Naughty words in the video below).
Sunday, April 4, 2010
MLB Season Preview
So, here we go. I rather liked the approach Cousin Ben took to his version of this same topic, so I'm going to ape it for a bit. Beginning with the big boy league, let's do this.
AL East:
1. Boston
2. Tampa
3. The Enemy
4. Baltimore
5. Toronto
So, I may be a bit biased here. If I was being a bit more objective, I'd note that the top 3 teams are the three best organizations in all of baseball, and any one of them could easily win the division. Also, it sucks to be either Toronto or Baltimore, although with the amounts of young talent Baltimore has, it probably sucks more to be Toronto. I also loved Baltimore's signing of Garrett Atkins, as an everyday warning to Matt Wieters of what he could become if he doesn't work hard.
AL Central:
1. Minnesota
2. Uggggghhhhhhhhhh. Bad, bad division. Chicago (White Sox), I guess. Confidently.
3. Cleveland
4. Detroit
5. Kansas 'Trust the Process' City
So, yeah. Even with Joe Nathan out, I like the Twins to win a weak division. I loved their offseason moves (Hardy, Pavano and Orlando Hudson headlining), and think they'll take the division even with Joe Mauer's inevitable regression and the sudden realization that Justin Morneau isn't all that great. Beyond that, it's a bit of a crapshoot. I at least trust Chicago's pitching staff, so they get the two spot. Cleveland has a lot of really interesting young hitting (Including absolute beast of a catcher prospect Carlos Santana, stolen from the Dodgers in exchange for Casey Blake) to go along with pitching slightly better than you'll find in an average game of wiffle ball. Detroit has Miguel Cabrera and did I mention Miguel Cabrera? Their actual plan for this season involves having Dontrelle Willis in their rotation. By design. The same Dontrelle Willis who, one month ago, described himself thusly: "To me, the issue is I'm terrible". Good luck with that. And also, there are the Royals.
AL West
1. Texas
2. Los Angeles of Anaheim of California of The United States of Planet Earth of The Milky Way of Whatever is Bigger Than That
3. Seattle
4. Oakland
No knock on Oakland, who could easily finish second in the AL Central. This is a good division top to bottom, with the Rangers riding an amazing wave of young talent right to its forefront (Interesting number of the preseason: 5. That is the number of players on the Rangers 40-man roster over the age of 30. That is amazing). I could see each of these teams finishing over .500. It won't happen in the end, but man, that would be cool. Anyway, after adding more pitching this offseason, I don't like Seattle all that much. I actually think they take a step back. They outperformed their pythagorean record last year, and Cliff Lee is already hurting. Still the best defense in baseball, but it's a small step back first for an organization which is undoubtedly on the rise. As for LAoAoCoTUSoPEoTMWoWiBTT, whatever. They are not at all exciting, and finally lose their death grip on the division this year to a Rangers team poised to start an impressive playoff run of their own.
On to AAAA!
AAAA East:
1. Philly
2. Atlanta
3. Florida
4. Washington
5. NY Mets
Yeah, that's the last-place team. I debated. Do I think it's a lock? No. But man, that's a bad, old team with no depth. At all. If anything goes wrong, it's going to go really wrong. So congrats to Omar Minaya for building the All-Downside Team. Why haven't they fired that guy yet? Anyway, on to more competent organizations. The Braves and Phillies are almost a coin flip at the top of the standings, but I'll take the Phillies riding a resurgent year from Cole Hamels, who was terribly unlucky last year. And I hear there's some 'Holiday' guy. Don't know what that's supposed to mean. The Braves are once again retooling around an impressive crop of talented youngsters, and should take the division from the aging Phillies in another year. In other news, the Marlins are now paying three players a livable wage, and the Nationals suck.
AAAA Central:
1. St. Louis
2. Cincinnati
3. Milwaukee
4. Chicago (Cubs)
5. Pittsburgh
6. Houston
I'm scared that Chris Carpenter's arm could fall off at any time, but I'll bet that he makes it through half the season first, which will give the Cardinals enough of a lead to coast to the playoffs in another bad division. I like Ben's pick of the Reds, but I think he's a year early on them. Next year, providing Dusty doesn't chop off Aroldis Chapman's arm with an axe, watch out for them. They have a lot of young talent, led by certifiable beast Jay Bruce (Joey Who? He's alright, I guess). Milwaukee imported Randy Wolf to try to stop the bleeding in the rotation, which would have been better last year if their opponents had been allowed to use a tee. Chicago has a bunch of terrible, expensive, aging players, and have willingly decided to let Carlos Silva start. Pittsburgh is still bad, but moving in the right direction. As for Houston, I will continue to beat the 'Ed Wade is terrible' drum until he is fired. Should be soon, considering how bad this roster is.
AAAA West
1. Colorado
2. Los Angeles
3. Arizona
4. San Francisco
5. San Diego
The last division. The Rockies have already lost Jeff Francis to the DL, which hurts (He was penciled in as their #2 starter). But I still think they can pull this out, led by a beast of a young offense. Though the sooner they get rid of Brad Hawpe, the better. Seth Smith, currently their 4th outfielder, is a better hitter than Hawpe, and also not the worst defensive right-fielder in baseball. So he's got that going for him. Which is nice. In LA, I think Manny continues his gradual decline, and phenom Clayton Kershaw takes a step back. This leaves a rotation of Chad Billingsley and pray for rain, which probably will not work well. Though I'm rooting for knuckleballer Charlie Haeger, who made the rotation as the fifth starter. The world can never have too many knuckleball pitchers. Arizona has some impressive talent, but not enough to make a run at the divisional title with Brandon Webb still not throwing. As for San Francisco, well, they're built entirely on their pitching. However, for some reason apparent only to their management, they have decided to surround the pitchers with players who can't hit or field. I'll probably go into this in more detail later. Cliff's notes version: Bad idea. And there is San Diego, which I'm told means "A Whale's Vagina".
I like Tampa and Atlanta to win the Wild Cards, with the World Series being Boston v. Colorado. And the Sox take it. Yes, I am biased. Now, on to more interesting things.
AL MVP - Evan Longoria. It's only a matter of time. We are all witnesses.
AL Cy Young - John Lester. With that defense behind him, he's going to be awesome.
AL RoY - Will be arbitrarily voted on. And not a pitcher.
AAAA MVP - Pujols. Every year, Pujols.
AAAA Cy Young - Ricky Nolasco. My fantasy team believes.
AAAA RoY - Jason Heyward. And he won't even be that good this year. Down the line, watch out.
And now for some longer thoughts:
Favorite stat of the offseason: Courtesy of Joe Posnanski. Last year, out of all the players in the majors who qualified for the batting title, only nine posted an OPS+ of 80 or less (An OPS of roughly 90% of the league average. Guys below this mark don't tend to stick around that long). Going into this season, the Royals are starting 5 players who achieved that dubious distinction.
Why the Red Sox won't get shut out every game: Dan Shaughnessy is a moron. See, last year, Boston's offense was still third-best in the AL, despite getting less than nothing from shortstop and catcher (Until the victor Martinez trade). Yes, Mike Cameron is an offensive downgrade from Jason Bay, but he is a huge defensive upgrade. The Sox are starting guys who have a legit chance at a Gold Glove at all four infield spots, and have good defenders at each outfield spot as well. All this without sacrificing much (If any) offense, and keeping flexibility down the road with short-term contracts. Awesome job by the front office. The defense will help ground-ball heavy pitchers more than the rest, so I look for big performances by Buchholz and Lester, and stick to my guns that the former will be better then John Lackey this year.
The odd Minnesota defense: the Twins pay close attention to infield defense, so much that they routinely start Nick Punto, who does not, technically, know which end of the bat to hold. This results in wonderful infield D, as well as many, many outs. Their outfield, on the other hand, can (kind of) hit (Delmon Young excepted). However, they play defense slightly worse than if the outfield was manned by me. Drunk. In a sack race. To put it mildly, I don't understand. Fortunately for them, their best pitchers are fly-ball oriented. Look, just because I picked them to win a crappy division doesn't mean I agree with everything they do.
What in the world is San Francisco doing?: They have the best pitcher in the game. They have a very good #2 pitcher. They have Barry Zito, who quietly has become respectable again, if not the ace he used to (appear) to be (He was rather lucky). They have Jonathan Sanchez, who may need corrective lenses of some kind, but is absolutely unhittable. And then, here is their positional lineup, along with whether or not the player can hit and field their position:
C: B. Molina (No/No)
1B: Aubrey Huff (No/Not really)
2B: Freddy Sanchez (-Ish/-Ish)
SS: Edgar Renteria (No/No)
3B: Pablo Sandoval (Yes/No)
LF: Mark Derosa (-Ish. He hits well for a second baseman/-Ish)
CF: Aaron Rowand (-Ish/No)
RF: Nate Schierholtz (Who? Is this a real player?)
Attention, Brian Sabean: You're wasting prime years of Tim Lincecum's career. Please cease and desist.
Worst contract of the offseason: Brandon Lyon, 3 years, $15 million, to Houston. A team way, way out of contention is handing out major guaranteed money to a guy who is league-average at the least important position on the roster. Wow.
Funniest thing of the offseason: The fact that, back in the day, Red Sox scribes used to bemoan the team's lack of pitching and defense in favor of all sluggers. Now that the team has focused on pitching and defense, we get articles about how the team won't score enough runs. I hope the Boston media dies in a fire.
And one more Royals note: Last year, Dayton Moore chided fans for not trusting 'The Process'. This offseason, we learned that 'The Process' is apparently to acquire every player they could find who was deemed not good enough to play for the White Sox. That ought to work well.
So, that's it. Let the season begin! If you have any questions on anything here, or anything I didn't cover, let me know. I'll throw up a comment or post in reply, depending on how long an answer it necessitates.
AL East:
1. Boston
2. Tampa
3. The Enemy
4. Baltimore
5. Toronto
So, I may be a bit biased here. If I was being a bit more objective, I'd note that the top 3 teams are the three best organizations in all of baseball, and any one of them could easily win the division. Also, it sucks to be either Toronto or Baltimore, although with the amounts of young talent Baltimore has, it probably sucks more to be Toronto. I also loved Baltimore's signing of Garrett Atkins, as an everyday warning to Matt Wieters of what he could become if he doesn't work hard.
AL Central:
1. Minnesota
2. Uggggghhhhhhhhhh. Bad, bad division. Chicago (White Sox), I guess. Confidently.
3. Cleveland
4. Detroit
5. Kansas 'Trust the Process' City
So, yeah. Even with Joe Nathan out, I like the Twins to win a weak division. I loved their offseason moves (Hardy, Pavano and Orlando Hudson headlining), and think they'll take the division even with Joe Mauer's inevitable regression and the sudden realization that Justin Morneau isn't all that great. Beyond that, it's a bit of a crapshoot. I at least trust Chicago's pitching staff, so they get the two spot. Cleveland has a lot of really interesting young hitting (Including absolute beast of a catcher prospect Carlos Santana, stolen from the Dodgers in exchange for Casey Blake) to go along with pitching slightly better than you'll find in an average game of wiffle ball. Detroit has Miguel Cabrera and did I mention Miguel Cabrera? Their actual plan for this season involves having Dontrelle Willis in their rotation. By design. The same Dontrelle Willis who, one month ago, described himself thusly: "To me, the issue is I'm terrible". Good luck with that. And also, there are the Royals.
AL West
1. Texas
2. Los Angeles of Anaheim of California of The United States of Planet Earth of The Milky Way of Whatever is Bigger Than That
3. Seattle
4. Oakland
No knock on Oakland, who could easily finish second in the AL Central. This is a good division top to bottom, with the Rangers riding an amazing wave of young talent right to its forefront (Interesting number of the preseason: 5. That is the number of players on the Rangers 40-man roster over the age of 30. That is amazing). I could see each of these teams finishing over .500. It won't happen in the end, but man, that would be cool. Anyway, after adding more pitching this offseason, I don't like Seattle all that much. I actually think they take a step back. They outperformed their pythagorean record last year, and Cliff Lee is already hurting. Still the best defense in baseball, but it's a small step back first for an organization which is undoubtedly on the rise. As for LAoAoCoTUSoPEoTMWoWiBTT, whatever. They are not at all exciting, and finally lose their death grip on the division this year to a Rangers team poised to start an impressive playoff run of their own.
On to AAAA!
AAAA East:
1. Philly
2. Atlanta
3. Florida
4. Washington
5. NY Mets
Yeah, that's the last-place team. I debated. Do I think it's a lock? No. But man, that's a bad, old team with no depth. At all. If anything goes wrong, it's going to go really wrong. So congrats to Omar Minaya for building the All-Downside Team. Why haven't they fired that guy yet? Anyway, on to more competent organizations. The Braves and Phillies are almost a coin flip at the top of the standings, but I'll take the Phillies riding a resurgent year from Cole Hamels, who was terribly unlucky last year. And I hear there's some 'Holiday' guy. Don't know what that's supposed to mean. The Braves are once again retooling around an impressive crop of talented youngsters, and should take the division from the aging Phillies in another year. In other news, the Marlins are now paying three players a livable wage, and the Nationals suck.
AAAA Central:
1. St. Louis
2. Cincinnati
3. Milwaukee
4. Chicago (Cubs)
5. Pittsburgh
6. Houston
I'm scared that Chris Carpenter's arm could fall off at any time, but I'll bet that he makes it through half the season first, which will give the Cardinals enough of a lead to coast to the playoffs in another bad division. I like Ben's pick of the Reds, but I think he's a year early on them. Next year, providing Dusty doesn't chop off Aroldis Chapman's arm with an axe, watch out for them. They have a lot of young talent, led by certifiable beast Jay Bruce (Joey Who? He's alright, I guess). Milwaukee imported Randy Wolf to try to stop the bleeding in the rotation, which would have been better last year if their opponents had been allowed to use a tee. Chicago has a bunch of terrible, expensive, aging players, and have willingly decided to let Carlos Silva start. Pittsburgh is still bad, but moving in the right direction. As for Houston, I will continue to beat the 'Ed Wade is terrible' drum until he is fired. Should be soon, considering how bad this roster is.
AAAA West
1. Colorado
2. Los Angeles
3. Arizona
4. San Francisco
5. San Diego
The last division. The Rockies have already lost Jeff Francis to the DL, which hurts (He was penciled in as their #2 starter). But I still think they can pull this out, led by a beast of a young offense. Though the sooner they get rid of Brad Hawpe, the better. Seth Smith, currently their 4th outfielder, is a better hitter than Hawpe, and also not the worst defensive right-fielder in baseball. So he's got that going for him. Which is nice. In LA, I think Manny continues his gradual decline, and phenom Clayton Kershaw takes a step back. This leaves a rotation of Chad Billingsley and pray for rain, which probably will not work well. Though I'm rooting for knuckleballer Charlie Haeger, who made the rotation as the fifth starter. The world can never have too many knuckleball pitchers. Arizona has some impressive talent, but not enough to make a run at the divisional title with Brandon Webb still not throwing. As for San Francisco, well, they're built entirely on their pitching. However, for some reason apparent only to their management, they have decided to surround the pitchers with players who can't hit or field. I'll probably go into this in more detail later. Cliff's notes version: Bad idea. And there is San Diego, which I'm told means "A Whale's Vagina".
I like Tampa and Atlanta to win the Wild Cards, with the World Series being Boston v. Colorado. And the Sox take it. Yes, I am biased. Now, on to more interesting things.
AL MVP - Evan Longoria. It's only a matter of time. We are all witnesses.
AL Cy Young - John Lester. With that defense behind him, he's going to be awesome.
AL RoY - Will be arbitrarily voted on. And not a pitcher.
AAAA MVP - Pujols. Every year, Pujols.
AAAA Cy Young - Ricky Nolasco. My fantasy team believes.
AAAA RoY - Jason Heyward. And he won't even be that good this year. Down the line, watch out.
And now for some longer thoughts:
Favorite stat of the offseason: Courtesy of Joe Posnanski. Last year, out of all the players in the majors who qualified for the batting title, only nine posted an OPS+ of 80 or less (An OPS of roughly 90% of the league average. Guys below this mark don't tend to stick around that long). Going into this season, the Royals are starting 5 players who achieved that dubious distinction.
Why the Red Sox won't get shut out every game: Dan Shaughnessy is a moron. See, last year, Boston's offense was still third-best in the AL, despite getting less than nothing from shortstop and catcher (Until the victor Martinez trade). Yes, Mike Cameron is an offensive downgrade from Jason Bay, but he is a huge defensive upgrade. The Sox are starting guys who have a legit chance at a Gold Glove at all four infield spots, and have good defenders at each outfield spot as well. All this without sacrificing much (If any) offense, and keeping flexibility down the road with short-term contracts. Awesome job by the front office. The defense will help ground-ball heavy pitchers more than the rest, so I look for big performances by Buchholz and Lester, and stick to my guns that the former will be better then John Lackey this year.
The odd Minnesota defense: the Twins pay close attention to infield defense, so much that they routinely start Nick Punto, who does not, technically, know which end of the bat to hold. This results in wonderful infield D, as well as many, many outs. Their outfield, on the other hand, can (kind of) hit (Delmon Young excepted). However, they play defense slightly worse than if the outfield was manned by me. Drunk. In a sack race. To put it mildly, I don't understand. Fortunately for them, their best pitchers are fly-ball oriented. Look, just because I picked them to win a crappy division doesn't mean I agree with everything they do.
What in the world is San Francisco doing?: They have the best pitcher in the game. They have a very good #2 pitcher. They have Barry Zito, who quietly has become respectable again, if not the ace he used to (appear) to be (He was rather lucky). They have Jonathan Sanchez, who may need corrective lenses of some kind, but is absolutely unhittable. And then, here is their positional lineup, along with whether or not the player can hit and field their position:
C: B. Molina (No/No)
1B: Aubrey Huff (No/Not really)
2B: Freddy Sanchez (-Ish/-Ish)
SS: Edgar Renteria (No/No)
3B: Pablo Sandoval (Yes/No)
LF: Mark Derosa (-Ish. He hits well for a second baseman/-Ish)
CF: Aaron Rowand (-Ish/No)
RF: Nate Schierholtz (Who? Is this a real player?)
Attention, Brian Sabean: You're wasting prime years of Tim Lincecum's career. Please cease and desist.
Worst contract of the offseason: Brandon Lyon, 3 years, $15 million, to Houston. A team way, way out of contention is handing out major guaranteed money to a guy who is league-average at the least important position on the roster. Wow.
Funniest thing of the offseason: The fact that, back in the day, Red Sox scribes used to bemoan the team's lack of pitching and defense in favor of all sluggers. Now that the team has focused on pitching and defense, we get articles about how the team won't score enough runs. I hope the Boston media dies in a fire.
And one more Royals note: Last year, Dayton Moore chided fans for not trusting 'The Process'. This offseason, we learned that 'The Process' is apparently to acquire every player they could find who was deemed not good enough to play for the White Sox. That ought to work well.
So, that's it. Let the season begin! If you have any questions on anything here, or anything I didn't cover, let me know. I'll throw up a comment or post in reply, depending on how long an answer it necessitates.
Saturday, September 26, 2009
This Year's Rays
So in the quick season predictions piece I put together in March, I dealt with the media fascination of which team would be this year's Rays, going from nowhere to contention. I said that no one would fill that role this year, and in one sense I was correct. But not in the sense of there not being a 'This year's Rays'. Because what the Rays really did was go from last to first by improving their defense, providing a blueprint that three teams have followed this year. And while none of those teams have had as large a turnaround as the Rays did last year, all three can make a case to be the Rays of this year (Please note that the Royals, preseason expert consensus to fill the Devil-free shoes this year, will not be appearing in this article except to note that Dayton Moore is a terrible General Manager who must have incriminating pictures of the team owner that he used to get his four-year extension. Or ownership is for some reason trying to lose games. Either/or).
In 2007 the Devil Rays were dreadful, both in the standings and with the glove(s), finishing in the AL East basement with a record of 66-96, and allowing 57.7 more runs than an average defensive team, worst in the league by a full 9.6 runs (All defensive data is UZR from Fangraphs, which is scaled to the simplest possible figure: +runs (Runs saved) and -runs (Runs allowed)). Then in 2008, the Rays suddenly jumped to +74.2 defensive runs as a team, best in the majors. How did they do this? It was surprisingly simple. They mostly moved their existing players around the diamond until they found a part where each was good, or at the least serviceable (Aiding this adjustment was the fact that many of the Rays' players were young and athletic, making positional transitions easier). BJ Upton was an absolute butcher in the infield, so he was shuffled to centerfield, where he was worth +10.3 runs in 2008 (To give you an idea of how good that is, playing Upton in center would completely cancel out playing (post-hip replacement) Mike Lowell at third, no easy task). Akinori Iwamura moved from third to second, and super-prospect Evan Longoria replaced him. Delmon Young and his impressive brand of butchery were exiled to Minnesota, replaced by Gabe Gross (+11.4). Carl Crawford rebounded from a poor 2007 to do that thing he does (+19.6). Essentially working with parts they already had, the Rays allowed 129.9 fewer runs in 2008 than in 2007 simply by improving their defense. So who made a similar leap this year? Three teams.
Firstly, we have the Detroit Tigers. They've gone from -39.1 to +44.0 over the course of one season by moving Brandon Inge to third (Where he excels to the tune of +9.6), getting Carlos Guillen out of the infield (And Guillen was hurt for quite a while this year, replaced by Josh Anderson in the outfield. Anderson hits worse than I do, but he's a great fielder), and replacing the corpse of Edgar Renteria with Adam Everett at shortstop. Add in that they played Magglio Ordonez less in right than in previous years and that Miguel Cabrera has proved surprisingly competent at first base and you have another last to first story, albeit a less dramatic one.
The Texas Rangers are the team that has gotten the most praise and press this year for revamping the defense, probably because they went about this in the most visible way of these three teams. The Rangers moved incumbent Gold Glove shortstop off the position to the less-demanding third base this offseason to make way for slick-fielding freshman Elvis Andrus. Young fought the move at first, leading to a good amount of ink spent on the issue. But eventually he relented, and the move has indisputably helped the team. The Rangers have gone from -51.7 in 2008 (Worst in the majors) to +33.0 (6th). A lot of this turnaround can be attributed directly to Young and Andrus. In 2008 the Rangers 3B position was an absolute revolving door, with the common link between all the men trotted out being putrid defense. Five men combined to cost the team 26.5 runs, far worse than even Manny Ramirez has managed in a single season. This year Young has improved the position from historically bad to merely bad, as he has staunched the bleeding to an extent by only being 7.5 runs worse than average. Meanwhile, Andrus has taken over for Young at short admirably, upping Young's -5.6 runs in 2008 to a Gold Glove-consideration-worthy +8.2 this year (See, Young's Gold Glove last year was silly and wrong. He didn't make errors primarily because he had no range, preventing him from, you know, fielding baseballs. We call it Derek Jeter Syndrome in these parts. Though Jason Bay Syndrome would also be appropriate and accurate). Josh Hamilton has been hurt, sparing the team a repeat of last year's version of centerfield butchery, Hank Blalock has been permanently DH'd to reduce the risk of injury to both himself and fans in the front rows, and statuesque wind turbine Chris Davis has been sent to first base under strict orders to not move anywhere else for the good of the team. The result? A surprising playoff contender.
But the most dramatic turnaround has been that of the Seattle Mariners. The Mariners fired the clueless Bill Bavasi after last-year's team became the first-ever 100-100 club ($100 million payroll, 100 losses), and replaced him with Jack Zduriencik to clean up the mess Bavasi left behind. And the early returns are beyond good. The Mariners have gone from a poor (Though not putrid) -20.9 runs last year to this year's league-leading figure of +76.2 runs. Yes, +76.2. That is a full 33% better than the second-best team in baseball (The Rays), an amazing margin. The key to this was the 17-team, 180,000 player deal between the Mariners, Nets and Indians which netted the M's both Endy 'Gold Glove' Chavez and, more importantly, The Big FraGu (Franklin Gutierrez). Chavez took over for the departed Raul Ibanez and his glove of -18 putrification, saving a quick 18 runs at the position before he suffered a season-ending injury. Ichiro slid back to RF from CF, replacing 'cast' there with his usual brand of steady D (+8.4). But most important is the man in centerfield. Gutierrez this year has been worth +24.7 runs, an amazing number that can essentially be read as 'Willie Mays in his prime' (Random Mays aside, apropos of nothing, from Bill James: "Catching Willie Mays in a rundown is like trying to assassinate a squirrel with a lawnmower.") Based on last year's free agent contracts, Gutierrez's defense alone has been worth $11.25 million to the Mariners this year, before you factor in his offense or position. He even managed to make Jarrod Washburn look competent for half a season. So, yeah. Nice trade. Then there's the infield, which is merely good rather than spectaular (Exiling Yuniesky Betancourt, a.k.a. The Worst Player in Major League Baseball, to KC helps a lot, as well as Adrian Beltre finally not being injured (Beltre's defense is awesome. He is not at all overpaid, as many media members like to claim)). Put them together and you have the best defensive team in the majors, and it's not even close.
So there it is, this year's Rays, as well as a bit on the value of defense, something that the Red Sox front office is hopefully paying close attention to (As the season has gone on, the Sox D has improved. They are now merely bad, as opposed to awful, which they were for the first three months of the year). And while none of these teams underwent as impressive a turnaround as the Rays did over the course of a single season, the fact that their General Managers seem to recognize both the value of defense and how to build around it bodes well for their respective futures, all of which look much brighter than they did a mere twelve months ago.
In 2007 the Devil Rays were dreadful, both in the standings and with the glove(s), finishing in the AL East basement with a record of 66-96, and allowing 57.7 more runs than an average defensive team, worst in the league by a full 9.6 runs (All defensive data is UZR from Fangraphs, which is scaled to the simplest possible figure: +runs (Runs saved) and -runs (Runs allowed)). Then in 2008, the Rays suddenly jumped to +74.2 defensive runs as a team, best in the majors. How did they do this? It was surprisingly simple. They mostly moved their existing players around the diamond until they found a part where each was good, or at the least serviceable (Aiding this adjustment was the fact that many of the Rays' players were young and athletic, making positional transitions easier). BJ Upton was an absolute butcher in the infield, so he was shuffled to centerfield, where he was worth +10.3 runs in 2008 (To give you an idea of how good that is, playing Upton in center would completely cancel out playing (post-hip replacement) Mike Lowell at third, no easy task). Akinori Iwamura moved from third to second, and super-prospect Evan Longoria replaced him. Delmon Young and his impressive brand of butchery were exiled to Minnesota, replaced by Gabe Gross (+11.4). Carl Crawford rebounded from a poor 2007 to do that thing he does (+19.6). Essentially working with parts they already had, the Rays allowed 129.9 fewer runs in 2008 than in 2007 simply by improving their defense. So who made a similar leap this year? Three teams.
Firstly, we have the Detroit Tigers. They've gone from -39.1 to +44.0 over the course of one season by moving Brandon Inge to third (Where he excels to the tune of +9.6), getting Carlos Guillen out of the infield (And Guillen was hurt for quite a while this year, replaced by Josh Anderson in the outfield. Anderson hits worse than I do, but he's a great fielder), and replacing the corpse of Edgar Renteria with Adam Everett at shortstop. Add in that they played Magglio Ordonez less in right than in previous years and that Miguel Cabrera has proved surprisingly competent at first base and you have another last to first story, albeit a less dramatic one.
The Texas Rangers are the team that has gotten the most praise and press this year for revamping the defense, probably because they went about this in the most visible way of these three teams. The Rangers moved incumbent Gold Glove shortstop off the position to the less-demanding third base this offseason to make way for slick-fielding freshman Elvis Andrus. Young fought the move at first, leading to a good amount of ink spent on the issue. But eventually he relented, and the move has indisputably helped the team. The Rangers have gone from -51.7 in 2008 (Worst in the majors) to +33.0 (6th). A lot of this turnaround can be attributed directly to Young and Andrus. In 2008 the Rangers 3B position was an absolute revolving door, with the common link between all the men trotted out being putrid defense. Five men combined to cost the team 26.5 runs, far worse than even Manny Ramirez has managed in a single season. This year Young has improved the position from historically bad to merely bad, as he has staunched the bleeding to an extent by only being 7.5 runs worse than average. Meanwhile, Andrus has taken over for Young at short admirably, upping Young's -5.6 runs in 2008 to a Gold Glove-consideration-worthy +8.2 this year (See, Young's Gold Glove last year was silly and wrong. He didn't make errors primarily because he had no range, preventing him from, you know, fielding baseballs. We call it Derek Jeter Syndrome in these parts. Though Jason Bay Syndrome would also be appropriate and accurate). Josh Hamilton has been hurt, sparing the team a repeat of last year's version of centerfield butchery, Hank Blalock has been permanently DH'd to reduce the risk of injury to both himself and fans in the front rows, and statuesque wind turbine Chris Davis has been sent to first base under strict orders to not move anywhere else for the good of the team. The result? A surprising playoff contender.
But the most dramatic turnaround has been that of the Seattle Mariners. The Mariners fired the clueless Bill Bavasi after last-year's team became the first-ever 100-100 club ($100 million payroll, 100 losses), and replaced him with Jack Zduriencik to clean up the mess Bavasi left behind. And the early returns are beyond good. The Mariners have gone from a poor (Though not putrid) -20.9 runs last year to this year's league-leading figure of +76.2 runs. Yes, +76.2. That is a full 33% better than the second-best team in baseball (The Rays), an amazing margin. The key to this was the 17-team, 180,000 player deal between the Mariners, Nets and Indians which netted the M's both Endy 'Gold Glove' Chavez and, more importantly, The Big FraGu (Franklin Gutierrez). Chavez took over for the departed Raul Ibanez and his glove of -18 putrification, saving a quick 18 runs at the position before he suffered a season-ending injury. Ichiro slid back to RF from CF, replacing 'cast' there with his usual brand of steady D (+8.4). But most important is the man in centerfield. Gutierrez this year has been worth +24.7 runs, an amazing number that can essentially be read as 'Willie Mays in his prime' (Random Mays aside, apropos of nothing, from Bill James: "Catching Willie Mays in a rundown is like trying to assassinate a squirrel with a lawnmower.") Based on last year's free agent contracts, Gutierrez's defense alone has been worth $11.25 million to the Mariners this year, before you factor in his offense or position. He even managed to make Jarrod Washburn look competent for half a season. So, yeah. Nice trade. Then there's the infield, which is merely good rather than spectaular (Exiling Yuniesky Betancourt, a.k.a. The Worst Player in Major League Baseball, to KC helps a lot, as well as Adrian Beltre finally not being injured (Beltre's defense is awesome. He is not at all overpaid, as many media members like to claim)). Put them together and you have the best defensive team in the majors, and it's not even close.
So there it is, this year's Rays, as well as a bit on the value of defense, something that the Red Sox front office is hopefully paying close attention to (As the season has gone on, the Sox D has improved. They are now merely bad, as opposed to awful, which they were for the first three months of the year). And while none of these teams underwent as impressive a turnaround as the Rays did over the course of a single season, the fact that their General Managers seem to recognize both the value of defense and how to build around it bodes well for their respective futures, all of which look much brighter than they did a mere twelve months ago.
Thursday, June 25, 2009
Analyzing Dice-K
Two days ago, Bob Ryan wrote an article entitled It Just Doesn't Add Up for the Boston Globe. The article is about the fact that Daisuke Matsuzaka is struggling this year, and isn't worth the money the Red Sox paid to sign him. In it Ryan briefly touches on the topics of interest, but never does any sort of actual analysis either of baseball's salary scale or of the reasons for Daisuke's ineffectiveness this year. So I will now attempt to pick up the ball he has dropped. Because with how awful the Red Sox media is, Lord knows someone needs to fill the void by competently discussing the team (These guys do a better job than I will ever manage, by the way).
Last year Daisuke went 18-3, a phenomenal Win-Loss record. However, he was nowhere near as good a pitcher as that suggests. Before I get into why, let's lay down some basic parameters here. The goal of pitching is to prevent runs, plain and simple. There are different ways of approaching this, the most effective of which is striking people out. Ground balls are another extremely effective method, as no amount of steroids Raul Ibanez injects before breakfast can cause a ground ball to go over the outfield fence. However, pitching is not the only factor here. Team defense accounts for approximately 1/3 of run prevention, leaving the pitcher responsible for the other 2/3. We'll come back to this point. And then we come to luck. It is really amazing how much dumb luck influences pitching. To paraphrase Bill James (a.k.a. Sabermetric Jesus), it is entirely possible that what I am going to refer to here as luck is not actually that, but rather just something that we do not yet know how to measure. And so it may be, but until we devise that measurement, luck it shall be. Things that are primarily luck include Batting Average on Balls In Play (Hereafter BABIP), Home Run per Fly Ball %, and Strand Rate. For more complete rundowns of these numbers, I recommend Fangraphs, The Hardball Times, or (If you'd rather pay money for something you can get for free) Baseball Prospectus. BABIP measures the amount of balls hit into the field of play that result in hits. Now, there are obviously things that affect this slightly, but by and large every pitcher's BABIP should be about .300. Numbers lower or higher than that are simply good luck or bad luck, and are completely unsustainable for extended periods of time for reasons beyond a pitcher's control. HR/FB for all pitchers should be right around 11%. The home park a pitcher spends his time in can affect this, but the only way to be certain to prevent home runs is to lower the rate at which you allow fly balls, as 11% of them are going to go over the fence. And finally, strand rate is simply the number of players who reach base against a pitcher who do not score. Simple enough. This should normalize around 72% for an average pitcher, with better pitchers being able to post slightly better numbers than that (For obvious reasons). Okay. I can't believe I haven't run down that stuff before, but that's done now. Since there was quite a bit of it, let's start fresh with a new paragraph.
As I mentioned above, Dice-K was 18-3 last year, with an excellent ERA of 2.90 (Earned Runs Allowed per 9 Innings, for those of you who are baseball neophytes. You've all stopped reading by now, haven't you?). But in truth, he was nowhere near that good. If we compare his 2008 statistics to his 2007 statistics, a year in which he was merely a solid pitcher rather than an ace, we find some rather startling results. Let's do this in chart-ish form.
K/9 (Strikeouts per 9 innings)
2007: 8.84
2008: 8.27
BB/9 (Walks per 9 innings)
2007: 3.52
2008: 5.05
BABIP:
2007: .306
2008: .267
HR/FB%:
2007: 11.7
2008: 7.5
Strand Rate:
2007: 73.9%
2008: 80.6%
Notice anything? In K/9 and BB/9, two luck-independent outcomes which are largely in the control of the pitcher, Matsuzaka actually performed worse in 2008 than in 2007, even though he improved his ERA by a full run and a half per game. This improvement is because of the last three numbers listed, luck-related statistics in which Daisuke performed at a rate far above the sustainable league average. In fact, if we normalize his luck-dependent stats to determine what his ERA should have been in each of those years (xFIP, if you're wondering), we find that in 2007 he pitched with an ERA of 4.42, while in 2008 he checked in with a worse showing of 4.82, a progression in the wrong direction. So he actually got worse between the two seasons, which still does not entirely explain this season's disaster. Ignoring the components to jump straight to the conclusion, what is his xFIP so far this year? 4.93, almost identical to last year. So what's the problem? Primarily bad luck. His K/9 and BB/9 have actually both improved from last year, and while there's still a long ways to go before his BB/9 hits a number that we can call 'good' (I'd settle for 'acceptable' at this point), it's legit improvement. But his BABIP has gone through the roof, checking in at an obscene .441, and his fly balls allowed are clearing the fence 17.5% of the time. These are the primary reasons for his decreased performance, and are things that should work themselves out over time. But is it entirely bad luck? No.
The thing about normalizing BABIP to exactly .300 for each pitcher is that this assumes that pitcher has a league-average defense taking the field behind him. This is almost never the case, meaning small variations in team BABIP should be expected, with good defensive teams posting a lower number, while poor defensive teams post a higher one. Last year's Red Sox were an excellent defensive team, posting the fourth-best UZR (Ultimate Zone Rating, available on Fangraphs. Why UZR? Because fielding percentage means less than nothing) in all of baseball. This year's version comes in 29th, only better than the beyond-inept Washington Nationals. The primary culprits are Mike Lowell, Julio Lugo and Jacoby Ellsbury, all of whom have fallen off a cliff (Since Lugo was fringe-average in the first place, this is not at all a good thing for him). The fact that Jason Bay has posted a worse showing in both years than Manny Ramirez did over the first half of last year is not really helping things, either. So while we should expect Daisuke's BABIP to rise above league average, we're still talking about a range closer to .310, not the stratosphere in which it currently resides. Given the chance, he will resume pitching at the level we are accustomed to seeing him at, even if we do not always understand what level that actually is.
Now let's go back to our good friend Bobby Boy. His article is not necessarily about how Daisuke is finished, but rather about the fact that Bob believes he is overpaid. Now that we've finished with a performance analysis, let's move on to salary matters. To argue his thesis statement in the article in question, Ryan provides us with the following pieces of evidence:
Daisuke's salary, presented in a misleading fashion
That is all
Besides making the reader question how Ryan still has a job, this does not actually accomplish much. Let's go through money matters now. Daisuke was a free agent in 2006. This is important because, in MLB, the rookie salary scale artificially depresses the salaries of young players for the first six years they are in the majors, years which are often their best. This makes baseball salaries often seem different than they actually are. Player salaries need to be divided up between cost-controlled youngsters and free agents to get an actual idea of what players are paid. And on the free agent market of the winter of 2006, free agents were paid about $4,000,000 per win above replacement player that they provided for their team the previous year. This amount increased linearly with each additional win, meaking a 2-win player worth $8 million, a 3-win player worth $12 million, and so on (This can be easily determined by merely dividing the total dollars all free agents were given that offseason by the WAR they collectively provided the previous year). Ryan does not once mention this. Now, I am not saying the best way to run a team is to go out and spend money on free agents. But if you do so, this is what it will cost you. This is the same free agent market where Carlos Silva is worth $12 million annually for four years (The Silva deal was signed one year later, when free agent value had risen to $4.5 million per win. The point stands). Providing this context makes Daisuke's deal look very reasonable, possibly even exactly where it should be, which is probably why Ryan did not put it in his article (Showing blatant disrespect for his reading audience, as he is presuming they will not know this. Either that or he does not know it himself, and is unwilling to research a subject before he writes about it, which calls into question why he has his job). In 2007, Daisuke was worth 3.9 Wins Above Replacement (WAR), or $15.6 million, based on the year he signed his contract. In 2008, 3.3 WAR, or $13.2 million. Per the terms of his contract, in 2007 Daisuke was paid $6 million by the Red Sox. In 2008 he made $8 million (By the way, lest you think I shouldn't be riding Ryan about the research, these numbers took me 17 seconds to find using Google. I timed myself). So why is he overpaid again?
Well, this is because Ryan combines the posting fee paid to his former team in Japan as part of Daisuke's salary. It is not. Daisuke was a professional athlete under obligation to remain in Japan. To release him from that deal, his team offered negotiation rights with him to the highest bidder, who happened to be the Red Sox. Essentially, the Red Sox spent $51 million to buy out his deal with his old team. Whether that was money well-spent or not, it is certainly not a part of his contract. And the fact that this money bought exclusive negotiation rights is almost certainly what enabled the Red Sox to sign Matsuzaka to what is actually a below-market deal. As you would not know if you read the Ryan article, Daisuke signed a contract for 6 years, for a total of $52 million dollars. Per the going rate of the free agent market, of which Daisuke was a member, this valued him at almost exactly the same worth as Odalis Perez. Why are you complaining, Bob? If the Red Sox get no value out of Daisuke the rest of the season, over the first three years of his contract they will have made a profit on the wins received for the money they've paid him so far, making the signing a good one for the team. And I hate watching him pitch. There is nothing more frustrating than watching a pitcher who seemingly cannot throw strikes. But it is still a good contract.
Ryan also seems to be objecting to one more thing, which is that Daisuke was billed as the Next Big Thing, and he has not delivered on that. Fair enough. But who billed him as that? Was it the man himself? Certainly not. It was the media, of which Bob Ryan is a large part. After Daisuke's seventh career start, Bob Ryan announced to the world that "The Daisuke Era has officially begun." Is there a single mention of the fact that what Ryan primarily objects to about Daisuke in his article is something that he himself helped create? No, there is not. Because writing that would involve both honesty and accountability, two qualities you are not likely to find in an article written by Bob Ryan. If you want to learn about baseball, the best thing you can do is avoid reading the Boston newspapers. All they will do is keep you mis- and uninformed.
Last year Daisuke went 18-3, a phenomenal Win-Loss record. However, he was nowhere near as good a pitcher as that suggests. Before I get into why, let's lay down some basic parameters here. The goal of pitching is to prevent runs, plain and simple. There are different ways of approaching this, the most effective of which is striking people out. Ground balls are another extremely effective method, as no amount of steroids Raul Ibanez injects before breakfast can cause a ground ball to go over the outfield fence. However, pitching is not the only factor here. Team defense accounts for approximately 1/3 of run prevention, leaving the pitcher responsible for the other 2/3. We'll come back to this point. And then we come to luck. It is really amazing how much dumb luck influences pitching. To paraphrase Bill James (a.k.a. Sabermetric Jesus), it is entirely possible that what I am going to refer to here as luck is not actually that, but rather just something that we do not yet know how to measure. And so it may be, but until we devise that measurement, luck it shall be. Things that are primarily luck include Batting Average on Balls In Play (Hereafter BABIP), Home Run per Fly Ball %, and Strand Rate. For more complete rundowns of these numbers, I recommend Fangraphs, The Hardball Times, or (If you'd rather pay money for something you can get for free) Baseball Prospectus. BABIP measures the amount of balls hit into the field of play that result in hits. Now, there are obviously things that affect this slightly, but by and large every pitcher's BABIP should be about .300. Numbers lower or higher than that are simply good luck or bad luck, and are completely unsustainable for extended periods of time for reasons beyond a pitcher's control. HR/FB for all pitchers should be right around 11%. The home park a pitcher spends his time in can affect this, but the only way to be certain to prevent home runs is to lower the rate at which you allow fly balls, as 11% of them are going to go over the fence. And finally, strand rate is simply the number of players who reach base against a pitcher who do not score. Simple enough. This should normalize around 72% for an average pitcher, with better pitchers being able to post slightly better numbers than that (For obvious reasons). Okay. I can't believe I haven't run down that stuff before, but that's done now. Since there was quite a bit of it, let's start fresh with a new paragraph.
As I mentioned above, Dice-K was 18-3 last year, with an excellent ERA of 2.90 (Earned Runs Allowed per 9 Innings, for those of you who are baseball neophytes. You've all stopped reading by now, haven't you?). But in truth, he was nowhere near that good. If we compare his 2008 statistics to his 2007 statistics, a year in which he was merely a solid pitcher rather than an ace, we find some rather startling results. Let's do this in chart-ish form.
K/9 (Strikeouts per 9 innings)
2007: 8.84
2008: 8.27
BB/9 (Walks per 9 innings)
2007: 3.52
2008: 5.05
BABIP:
2007: .306
2008: .267
HR/FB%:
2007: 11.7
2008: 7.5
Strand Rate:
2007: 73.9%
2008: 80.6%
Notice anything? In K/9 and BB/9, two luck-independent outcomes which are largely in the control of the pitcher, Matsuzaka actually performed worse in 2008 than in 2007, even though he improved his ERA by a full run and a half per game. This improvement is because of the last three numbers listed, luck-related statistics in which Daisuke performed at a rate far above the sustainable league average. In fact, if we normalize his luck-dependent stats to determine what his ERA should have been in each of those years (xFIP, if you're wondering), we find that in 2007 he pitched with an ERA of 4.42, while in 2008 he checked in with a worse showing of 4.82, a progression in the wrong direction. So he actually got worse between the two seasons, which still does not entirely explain this season's disaster. Ignoring the components to jump straight to the conclusion, what is his xFIP so far this year? 4.93, almost identical to last year. So what's the problem? Primarily bad luck. His K/9 and BB/9 have actually both improved from last year, and while there's still a long ways to go before his BB/9 hits a number that we can call 'good' (I'd settle for 'acceptable' at this point), it's legit improvement. But his BABIP has gone through the roof, checking in at an obscene .441, and his fly balls allowed are clearing the fence 17.5% of the time. These are the primary reasons for his decreased performance, and are things that should work themselves out over time. But is it entirely bad luck? No.
The thing about normalizing BABIP to exactly .300 for each pitcher is that this assumes that pitcher has a league-average defense taking the field behind him. This is almost never the case, meaning small variations in team BABIP should be expected, with good defensive teams posting a lower number, while poor defensive teams post a higher one. Last year's Red Sox were an excellent defensive team, posting the fourth-best UZR (Ultimate Zone Rating, available on Fangraphs. Why UZR? Because fielding percentage means less than nothing) in all of baseball. This year's version comes in 29th, only better than the beyond-inept Washington Nationals. The primary culprits are Mike Lowell, Julio Lugo and Jacoby Ellsbury, all of whom have fallen off a cliff (Since Lugo was fringe-average in the first place, this is not at all a good thing for him). The fact that Jason Bay has posted a worse showing in both years than Manny Ramirez did over the first half of last year is not really helping things, either. So while we should expect Daisuke's BABIP to rise above league average, we're still talking about a range closer to .310, not the stratosphere in which it currently resides. Given the chance, he will resume pitching at the level we are accustomed to seeing him at, even if we do not always understand what level that actually is.
Now let's go back to our good friend Bobby Boy. His article is not necessarily about how Daisuke is finished, but rather about the fact that Bob believes he is overpaid. Now that we've finished with a performance analysis, let's move on to salary matters. To argue his thesis statement in the article in question, Ryan provides us with the following pieces of evidence:
Daisuke's salary, presented in a misleading fashion
That is all
Besides making the reader question how Ryan still has a job, this does not actually accomplish much. Let's go through money matters now. Daisuke was a free agent in 2006. This is important because, in MLB, the rookie salary scale artificially depresses the salaries of young players for the first six years they are in the majors, years which are often their best. This makes baseball salaries often seem different than they actually are. Player salaries need to be divided up between cost-controlled youngsters and free agents to get an actual idea of what players are paid. And on the free agent market of the winter of 2006, free agents were paid about $4,000,000 per win above replacement player that they provided for their team the previous year. This amount increased linearly with each additional win, meaking a 2-win player worth $8 million, a 3-win player worth $12 million, and so on (This can be easily determined by merely dividing the total dollars all free agents were given that offseason by the WAR they collectively provided the previous year). Ryan does not once mention this. Now, I am not saying the best way to run a team is to go out and spend money on free agents. But if you do so, this is what it will cost you. This is the same free agent market where Carlos Silva is worth $12 million annually for four years (The Silva deal was signed one year later, when free agent value had risen to $4.5 million per win. The point stands). Providing this context makes Daisuke's deal look very reasonable, possibly even exactly where it should be, which is probably why Ryan did not put it in his article (Showing blatant disrespect for his reading audience, as he is presuming they will not know this. Either that or he does not know it himself, and is unwilling to research a subject before he writes about it, which calls into question why he has his job). In 2007, Daisuke was worth 3.9 Wins Above Replacement (WAR), or $15.6 million, based on the year he signed his contract. In 2008, 3.3 WAR, or $13.2 million. Per the terms of his contract, in 2007 Daisuke was paid $6 million by the Red Sox. In 2008 he made $8 million (By the way, lest you think I shouldn't be riding Ryan about the research, these numbers took me 17 seconds to find using Google. I timed myself). So why is he overpaid again?
Well, this is because Ryan combines the posting fee paid to his former team in Japan as part of Daisuke's salary. It is not. Daisuke was a professional athlete under obligation to remain in Japan. To release him from that deal, his team offered negotiation rights with him to the highest bidder, who happened to be the Red Sox. Essentially, the Red Sox spent $51 million to buy out his deal with his old team. Whether that was money well-spent or not, it is certainly not a part of his contract. And the fact that this money bought exclusive negotiation rights is almost certainly what enabled the Red Sox to sign Matsuzaka to what is actually a below-market deal. As you would not know if you read the Ryan article, Daisuke signed a contract for 6 years, for a total of $52 million dollars. Per the going rate of the free agent market, of which Daisuke was a member, this valued him at almost exactly the same worth as Odalis Perez. Why are you complaining, Bob? If the Red Sox get no value out of Daisuke the rest of the season, over the first three years of his contract they will have made a profit on the wins received for the money they've paid him so far, making the signing a good one for the team. And I hate watching him pitch. There is nothing more frustrating than watching a pitcher who seemingly cannot throw strikes. But it is still a good contract.
Ryan also seems to be objecting to one more thing, which is that Daisuke was billed as the Next Big Thing, and he has not delivered on that. Fair enough. But who billed him as that? Was it the man himself? Certainly not. It was the media, of which Bob Ryan is a large part. After Daisuke's seventh career start, Bob Ryan announced to the world that "The Daisuke Era has officially begun." Is there a single mention of the fact that what Ryan primarily objects to about Daisuke in his article is something that he himself helped create? No, there is not. Because writing that would involve both honesty and accountability, two qualities you are not likely to find in an article written by Bob Ryan. If you want to learn about baseball, the best thing you can do is avoid reading the Boston newspapers. All they will do is keep you mis- and uninformed.
Sunday, January 4, 2009
Defense and Manny Ramirez (In the Same Sentence)
The New Year has come and gone, and the sometimes lovable, sometimes frustrating goofball who happens to double as one of the five best right-handed hitters in the history of baseball remains unemployed. As opposed to the still-controversial lack of contract offers to baseball's home run king last offseason, there are no cries of collusion amongst owners where Manny Ramirez is concerned. Rather, Manny simply appears to have misplayed a weak hand into becoming a free agent at the worst possible time. Beyond the economic downturn that seems to have all MLB teams not nicknamed the Yankees hesitant to sign ballplayers to large contracts, most franchises not named the Phillies seem to be realizing how much monetary value defense has for them. The best current example of this is the Rays. Returning basically the same, seemingly-inept pitching staff from 2007, Tampa went from allowing the most runs in the American League to allowing the second-fewest. While it is only right to attribute some of this improvement to their pitching staff, a large portion of the credit must go to the defense. They went from allowing -54.2 more runs than an MLB-average franchise defensively in 2007 to being 70.2 runs above average this season, quite the improvement in terms of tracking down shots hit into the gaps (As a sidenote, I believe the fielding runs rate is something along the lines of 0.8 runs per play, but I can't for the life of me remember or find the conversions right now). But this does not tell the whole story. While it measures the runs a team has saved with the leather, it does not take into effect what these catches do about the runners already on base. In 2007, Rays pitchers had a strand rate of 66.8% (This seems fairly self-explanatory, but strand rate is the percentage of runners who reach base but do not go on to score a run). In 2008 this increased to 74%, much of which can be attributed to balls that would have been RBI doubles the previous season now being turned into outs. Over the course of the season, 1,875 players reached base against the Rays via a walk or a hit, meaning that this 7.2% increase in strand rate kept 134 runs from scoring. And this is where Manny enters the picture.
Beyond entering the free agent market during a recession, as well as at the same time as four other players who do the exact same things Manny does, albeit not quite as well (The job description from here on out shall be referred to as 'Defensively-Challenged Slugger'. These players (Pat Burrell, Adam Dunn, Raul Ibanez and Bobby Abreu, for those of you keeping score at home (If we expand the player pool to include DHs (The position all these players should probably be stuck at), Jason Giambi needs to be included as well)) are all corner outfielders by trade). If we use Tom Tango's positional conversion chart, the value of these four players to their future employers actually increases if they leave their glove behind and DH. You have to REALLY suck at fielding for that to happen. And Manny is regarded by most fielding statistics (And evaluations) as being the worst of this bunch, giving back a substantial portion of the offensive lead he has over his job competitors with his putrid leather. Add in that teams (Again, non-Phillies division (If I get bored, I'll pile on about the Ibanez signing sometime. But not today. Today I'll stick to snide references to it)) have begun to understand the dollars that should be attached to a player's defense, and Manny is up against as perfect a storm as anyone who employs Scott Boras can be. But Manny's defense may actually be undervalued. Brian Cartwright at Statistically Speaking made an attempt to accommodate for the odd shape of Fenway Park by examining the Retrosheet data from 2003-2006 and found that non-home-run fly balls to left field, balls that fall in for hits 17.1 percent of the time at other parks, were scored as hits 31.3 percent of the time at Fenway. I'd recommend reading his piece for the actual results and the gory details (You can find the article here), but Manny's D is nowhere near as bad as it's typically believed to be (Worst left fielder in the new analysis: Raul Ibanez. Alright, I'll stop now. Maybe). The Green Monster actually has caused a substantial portion of his seeming ineptitude (That it has likely helped his offense as well is a subject outside this post's purview). Because of this and the depressed price the market seems likely to force on him, Manny may actually be an outright steal for the next few years. With the caveat here being history, which may be scaring off more teams than his glove.
You see, eight months ago Manny was signed to a contract that had become a relative bargain, a club option for each of the next two years at $20 million per (A bargain by baseball standards, people). Manny decided that he no longer wished to play for the team he was bound to by this contract, and staged a ridiculously impressive push for a trade consisting of sitting out games for no reason whatsoever, feuding with the team about this, and shoving a man well past 50 in the employ of the team to the ground. If you are the general manager of a baseball team and sign Manny Ramirez to a deal good for your club, what will happen when he realizes it? This is the risk associated with employing the dreadlocked wonder, not his defense. But as many teams (Presumably) use more traditional defensive measurements than park-adjusted play-by-play data, Manny is looking at quite a lengthy winter with those two black marks against him. Scott Boras has long been regarded as some sort of Satanic superagent, and he's going to have to use all his demonic minions and/or powers to get the deal that this time (For once) his client actually deserves.
Also, Raul Ibanez's baseball skills are vastly overrated.
Beyond entering the free agent market during a recession, as well as at the same time as four other players who do the exact same things Manny does, albeit not quite as well (The job description from here on out shall be referred to as 'Defensively-Challenged Slugger'. These players (Pat Burrell, Adam Dunn, Raul Ibanez and Bobby Abreu, for those of you keeping score at home (If we expand the player pool to include DHs (The position all these players should probably be stuck at), Jason Giambi needs to be included as well)) are all corner outfielders by trade). If we use Tom Tango's positional conversion chart, the value of these four players to their future employers actually increases if they leave their glove behind and DH. You have to REALLY suck at fielding for that to happen. And Manny is regarded by most fielding statistics (And evaluations) as being the worst of this bunch, giving back a substantial portion of the offensive lead he has over his job competitors with his putrid leather. Add in that teams (Again, non-Phillies division (If I get bored, I'll pile on about the Ibanez signing sometime. But not today. Today I'll stick to snide references to it)) have begun to understand the dollars that should be attached to a player's defense, and Manny is up against as perfect a storm as anyone who employs Scott Boras can be. But Manny's defense may actually be undervalued. Brian Cartwright at Statistically Speaking made an attempt to accommodate for the odd shape of Fenway Park by examining the Retrosheet data from 2003-2006 and found that non-home-run fly balls to left field, balls that fall in for hits 17.1 percent of the time at other parks, were scored as hits 31.3 percent of the time at Fenway. I'd recommend reading his piece for the actual results and the gory details (You can find the article here), but Manny's D is nowhere near as bad as it's typically believed to be (Worst left fielder in the new analysis: Raul Ibanez. Alright, I'll stop now. Maybe). The Green Monster actually has caused a substantial portion of his seeming ineptitude (That it has likely helped his offense as well is a subject outside this post's purview). Because of this and the depressed price the market seems likely to force on him, Manny may actually be an outright steal for the next few years. With the caveat here being history, which may be scaring off more teams than his glove.
You see, eight months ago Manny was signed to a contract that had become a relative bargain, a club option for each of the next two years at $20 million per (A bargain by baseball standards, people). Manny decided that he no longer wished to play for the team he was bound to by this contract, and staged a ridiculously impressive push for a trade consisting of sitting out games for no reason whatsoever, feuding with the team about this, and shoving a man well past 50 in the employ of the team to the ground. If you are the general manager of a baseball team and sign Manny Ramirez to a deal good for your club, what will happen when he realizes it? This is the risk associated with employing the dreadlocked wonder, not his defense. But as many teams (Presumably) use more traditional defensive measurements than park-adjusted play-by-play data, Manny is looking at quite a lengthy winter with those two black marks against him. Scott Boras has long been regarded as some sort of Satanic superagent, and he's going to have to use all his demonic minions and/or powers to get the deal that this time (For once) his client actually deserves.
Also, Raul Ibanez's baseball skills are vastly overrated.
Friday, December 19, 2008
Burnett
And now for the other new pitcher, AJ Burnett. This is a more controversial signing than Sabathia, even though the attached pricetag is much smaller. Analysts seem to disagree on Burnett's value, some placing him as a very good pitcher who could become one of the best in the league if everything clicks (Keith Law, of ESPN) to feeling Burnett cannot be relied on for anything, including watching pies cool on windowsills (Steven Goldman, of the YES Network). In all probability, Burnett's results will lie somewhere in the middle of these two extremes. One of the first things to note about Burnett is his high strikeout rate (9.39 K/9 last year, third among qualified starters). However, Burnett also brings more control issues to the table than most high-strikeout pitchers. Among starters who struck out more than 8 batters per nine innings last year, Burnett's rate of 3.50 BB/9 ranks him 11th out of 17, with the only people worse than him being either very young (Tim Lincecum, Edinson Volquez, Johnny Cueto and Chad Billingsley), terrible (Oliver Perez) or apparently exempt to every single law of pitching and likely to cause me heart failure (Daisuke Matsuzaka, damn his eyes). In spite of this wildness, Burnett has a saving grace. Many high-strikeout pitchers are fly ball, and therefore home run, prone, as kicking back to put a little something extra on a pitch causes them to elevate it in the zone. Not so with Burnett. Out of our earlier group of 17, AJ's GB/FB ratio ranked second by a hair at 1.52. So, although he does put extra men on first, he also keeps the ball both in the park (I have yet to see the ground ball that could go over the fence. Although that is something I would absolutely love to see), and in position to get twin killings. While this doesn't get rid of the negative factors associated with his high walk rate, this does definitely help to mitigate the damage, and on a good team with a good defensive infield (Such as, say, last year's Blue Jays (Though oddly enough, AJ's BABIP was a very-unlucky .328 last year in spite of this) (Also oddly, the Blue Jays, despite posting a good team UZR, were fifth-worst in the league in double plays turned. Apparently David Eckstein's scrappiness quotient (SqA) isn't high enough (RIP, FJM) to rescue them)), the combination of strikeouts and ground balls probably would serve to elevate Burnett into at least the second tier of MLB starters. Unfortunately for AJ, he is going to be pitching in front of the Yankees patented Middle Infield Defensive Vortex of Suck. This shouldn't come as a great surprise to anyone out there, but Derek Jeter and Robinson Cano are both somewhere between bad and awful on defense*.
*Let's use a footnote-ish thing here to go into specifics. Last year, Derek Jeter posted his second-best UZR/150 (Ultimate Zone Rating per 150 Games) ever, being merely 0.4 plays worse than the average shortstop over the course of the season. Now, UZR/150 data has only been collected since 2002, and it is somewhere between possible and probable that peak-era Jeter posted better numbers than the aging version this data has been collected about. Still, projecting forward based on 7 years of data and factoring in a bit of an aging curve, calling Jeter a below-average defensive shortstop for next year seems like a very safe bet. The other half of the double play combination, Robinson Cano, has been all over the UZR/150 map in his four professional seasons, posting UZRs ranging from 8.3 (Which is very solid) to -16.9 (Let's play Manny Ramirez at second base!). He's been below average three of those four years, and scouting reports are not exceptionally kind to him either (Tom Tango's Fan Scouting fielding report actually has him given the exact same grade as Derek Jeter this year). Summary - They're bad at fielding.
And while getting away from the Blue Jays' double-team turning prowess can only help Burnett, he's going to the team that ranked one spot ahead of the Jays last year on that list, and sports a worse outfield D to boot. So while the Yanks are getting a very good pitcher, the odds of him making a leap to a new level seems pretty low considering his supporting cast. And this is only considering when he pitches. As opposed to Sabathia, who is an injury risk because of the history of other pitchers rather than himself, Burnett has spent what often seems like the majority of his career in the trainers room. If I were an oddsmaker (Which I most definitely am not), I would set the odds of both Burnett and Sabathia making it through the next five years with good health below five percent. But based on the way the Yankees are acting this offseason, I'm not sure if they care too much about that. It seems like as long as they get 60+ starts out of Burnett and Sabathia this year, they'll be happy, and let the chips fall where they may down the road.
*Let's use a footnote-ish thing here to go into specifics. Last year, Derek Jeter posted his second-best UZR/150 (Ultimate Zone Rating per 150 Games) ever, being merely 0.4 plays worse than the average shortstop over the course of the season. Now, UZR/150 data has only been collected since 2002, and it is somewhere between possible and probable that peak-era Jeter posted better numbers than the aging version this data has been collected about. Still, projecting forward based on 7 years of data and factoring in a bit of an aging curve, calling Jeter a below-average defensive shortstop for next year seems like a very safe bet. The other half of the double play combination, Robinson Cano, has been all over the UZR/150 map in his four professional seasons, posting UZRs ranging from 8.3 (Which is very solid) to -16.9 (Let's play Manny Ramirez at second base!). He's been below average three of those four years, and scouting reports are not exceptionally kind to him either (Tom Tango's Fan Scouting fielding report actually has him given the exact same grade as Derek Jeter this year). Summary - They're bad at fielding.
And while getting away from the Blue Jays' double-team turning prowess can only help Burnett, he's going to the team that ranked one spot ahead of the Jays last year on that list, and sports a worse outfield D to boot. So while the Yanks are getting a very good pitcher, the odds of him making a leap to a new level seems pretty low considering his supporting cast. And this is only considering when he pitches. As opposed to Sabathia, who is an injury risk because of the history of other pitchers rather than himself, Burnett has spent what often seems like the majority of his career in the trainers room. If I were an oddsmaker (Which I most definitely am not), I would set the odds of both Burnett and Sabathia making it through the next five years with good health below five percent. But based on the way the Yankees are acting this offseason, I'm not sure if they care too much about that. It seems like as long as they get 60+ starts out of Burnett and Sabathia this year, they'll be happy, and let the chips fall where they may down the road.
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